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Abstract
This paper studies the impact of the conditional cash transfer program
Solidaridad on changes in the labor market of the Dominican Republic
based on statistical data from the Evaluation of the Social Security Sur-
vey 2010. The estimation methodology is based on matching techniques,
which can discern the impact on both benenet-receiving and non-benet-
receiving households. The results show a negative but very small impact
of the di¤erent components of the program on labor market indicators,
especially for the components related to children. However, the estimates
show some heterogeneity in the e¤ects on the most vulnerable sectors of
the population.
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1
1 Introduction
The policy of redistribution of resources through conditional cash transfers (CCT) has
become one of the most important tools used by governments to reduce levels of poverty
and improve citizens’ quality of life. Currently, these programs have been implemented in a
variety of countries that range from the poorest and developing (e.g., Bolivia, Bangladesh,
Nigeria, etc.) to more developed countries (e.g., Japan and USA).1
Cash transfers are based on the contribution of cash to households that meet a number
of previously stipulated objectives for investment in the human capital of the recipients’
children to achieve health and education goals. The establishment of these goals not only
assumes that households do not have enough resources to invest the ”optimum” level
in human capital based on social and political parameters but also assumes that these
households may underestimate returns on investment in education. In the case of the
Dominican Republic, for example, Jensen (2010) estimates that the perception of eighth
graders on the return on investment in education is approximately one quarter of the rate
of return derived from an income survey.2
One of the main issues to be discussed when CCT programs are implemented is their
potential impact on the labor supply of adults. From a theoretical point of view, the
impact of these programs can be diverse. For example, if we consider leisure as a normal
good, the effect of transfer programs can be negative in terms of employment because an
increase in the income of individuals via cash transfers could increase the consumption of
leisure and reduce the labor supply. Additionally, workers may choose to reduce their labor
supply to qualify for benefits, or individuals may demonstrate less availability for work.
However, for those groups who are outside the labor market and for whom consumption
of leisure relative to labor is high, the impact could result in greater efforts in the job
search. Because individual preferences are crucial in this process, conclusions about the
1In the case of Japan, the aid programs for secondary education stand out. In the United States, the
cash transfer programs of New York City and Washington D.C. have been remarkable.
2Another way that parents may underestimate the return on the education of their children is when
they discount the future with a higher weighted rate than they should.
impact of CCT on labor supply can only be determined empirically (Rosen, 2009).
Our investigation uses statistical information from the Dominican Republic’s Eval-
uation of Social Security Survey 2010 to study the impact of the Solidaridad program
on household behavior as measured through changes in labor force participation, income
and informality. For this purpose, quasi-experimental methods are used as pared esti-
mates (matching) that may help identify impacts on benefit-receiving households and
non-beneficiaries. The contributions of this study will be useful not only for public policy
in the Dominican Republic for defining the effect on labor markets (positive or negative)
of the Solidaridad program, but it will also add new material to the existing literature in
terms of the evaluation of the impact of such programs on informality.
From an empirical perspective, the issue has been addressed extensively in developed
and medium-developed countries, and conclusions on the effects of CCT programs depend
on the characteristics of each program and the incentives that participants receive. For
example, Saez (2002) finds that cash transfer programs in the United States reduce the
intensity of work of employees but increase the level of labor force participation of the
unemployed. Similarly, Keane and Moffitt (1998) demonstrate that individuals who si-
multaneously participate in multiple transfer programs do not reduce their labor supply.
However, these results differ from studies on the effects of unconditional transfer pro-
grams, where there is a significant reduction in the labor force participation of enrollees
(Moffitt, 2002; Tabor, 2002).
In the case of Latin America, a number of studies have examined the effect of con-
ditional transfers on labor market, poverty, health, education and food indicators. In
general, there are significant positive relationship between participation in transfer pro-
grams, the increase in labor supply and improved incomes (Fizbein and Schady, 2009;
L. Alzu´a and Ripani, 2009). For example, CCT recipient households did not reduce in
any way the labor supply in the case of Ecuador and Mexico. However, there is a sig-
nificant reduction in the child labor supply, especially in Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico and
Nicaragua (Cecchini and Madariaga, 2011). Moreover, it is estimated that the Red de
Proteccio´n Social program in Nicaragua has caused a decrease in poverty levels between
five and nine points in the count rates and poverty gap. In Honduras, there is only a
slight increase in consumption for households that receive conditional transfers compared
to similar households that do not receive them, which is an expected result given the
small size of the transfers.3
Some studies link the decisions of individuals to choose a type of employment (e.g.,
formal or informal) to the availability of additional income and/or funding from other
sources. For example, in a recent report published by the World Bank (2005), the in-
crease in micro-enterprise is attributed to the growth of remittances and the tourism
sector. Dependence on external sources for these resources combined with the unfavor-
able international economic environment of recent years makes the informal-sector workers
a very vulnerable segment of the Dominican population.4
Other studies focus on how economic growth and business cycles affect the employment
level (OIT, 1975; Garc´ıa and Valdivia, 1985). In general, these studies indicate that
although the Dominican economy has been characterized by strong GDP growth compared
to other countries in the region, this growth has not manifested in a significant decrease
in the unemployment level. However, the low response of unemployment to changes
in the business cycle may be explained by the size and divergence of the definition of
unemployment as well as by problems in its measurement (Gregory, 1997; Ma´rquez, 1998).
In general, studies devoted to the analysis of the Dominican labor market have been
characterized by a lack of technical rigor because they are based on descriptions of statis-
tical information from sources that are sometimes not comparable. In turn, the lack of a
systematic construction of economic indicators related to the labor market has led most
3In terms of health and education, CCTs have significantly increased school enrollment and atten-
dance in both Latin American middle-income countries such as Chile (7.5%), Colombia (2.1%) and Mexico
(1.9%), and lower income countries such as Honduras (3.3%), Nicaragua (6.6%) and Ecuador (10.3%).
However, despite the fact that CCT programs have a significantly positive impact on school attendance
levels, these programs do not seem to influence school performance test results or learning levels. Fur-
thermore, the effect of the programs on the use of preventive health services is not very clear (Fizbein
and Schady, 2009).
4For an analysis of the importance of micro-enterprises in the creation of jobs in the Dominican
Republic and the role that women have played in this sector, see Cabal (1993).
studies to focus on the analysis of surveys; the Labor Force Survey of the Central Bank
is one of the most consulted sources (Sa´nchez-Fung, 2000).
Recently, with the financial aid of international organizations, the establishment of new
assistance and training programs has allowed a more rigorous analysis of the Dominican
labor market. For example, Card et al. (2011) analyze the impact on employment gener-
ation of the Juventud y Empleo Program (2001-2006), which provides training and skills
development for young people age 18 to 29. Using a random sample of applicants to the
program, the authors find little evidence that participation in training programs affects
the employment status (employed or unemployed) of individuals participating in the pro-
gram, although they do encounter evidence of a slight increase in participants’ levels of
income (10). 5
Finally, conditional transfer programs have experienced a major peak in Latin America
since the mid-1990s, from only 3 countries in 1997 to 18 countries in 2010 (see Table 8
in the Appendix). The impact of these programs has been quantified. These programs
have not only achieved significant impacts in reducing poverty and on social inequality
indicators but are also considered instruments that are founded on beliefs in extensive
social protection and universal notions of rights (Cecchini and Mart´ınez, 2011). Therefore,
the importance of these programs for the target population lies in the fact that they can
still be used as tools for social policy in the region. It is to this aspect that this study
aims to make a contribution.
2 Estimation Methodology
The methodology proposed to conduct the research is the impact evaluation method-
ology based on the propensity score matching technique developed by Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1983). The analysis focuses on the full sample to determine the program’s impact
on the behavior of beneficiary households, measured by labor force participation, wages
5The Juventud y Empleo Program was developed and implemented by the Dominican government
with financial assistance from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).
and informality through the propensity score matching technique and the estimation of
differences in average effect on treatment of the treated (ATT), described below.
2.1 Propensity Score Matching an Differences of the ATT
To evaluate the program’s impact on the labor market, it is necessary to consider two
aspects: (i) the impossibility of knowing what would have been the participants’ behavior
(or result, called Y ) if they had not participated in the program - what is called the coun-
terfactual state, and (ii) the possibility that participant and non-participant households
differ systematically, i.e., there are intrinsic characteristics of each household group.
The first of these issues is important because, if in addition to information on the
results of households that participate in the program it was also known what the results
would be if they did not participate, it would only be necessary to calculate the difference
between the result “with participation” (Y 1) and the result “with no participation” (Y 0).
The second issue refers to the distribution of households participating, which is not purely
random. If the results obtained by the participating households are only compared with
non-participants, the differences might mistakenly be attributed to the results of partici-
pation, when in fact the differences are due to observable characteristics inherent to each
group (socioeconomic status, for example).
The propensity score matching methodology allows us to manage both issues by pair-
ing the receiving and not-receiving households that have similar observable characteris-
tics. According to this methodology, “participation” can be treated as a “treatment” in
which some households participate and others do not. Participating households make the
“treatment group” and not-participating households constitute the “control group”. The
important issue is that the households in both groups have similar, observable character-
istics. Thus, we can estimate the average effect of treatment on the treated (ATT) by
finding the average of the difference between the results from households in the ”treat-
ment group” and the results from households in the ”control group”, which represents the
counterfactual state. Formally:
Let Pi be an indicator of participation, which takes the value of 1 if the household
participates and 0 otherwise, and let Y 1i be the result (household behavior) conditioned
by its participation (Pi = 1) and Y
0
i be the result conditioned by its non-participation
(Pi = 0).
Then, the average effect of treatment on the treated is given by:
ATT = E(Y 1i − Y 0i |Pi = 1) = E[Y 1i |Pi = 1]− E[Y 0i |Pi = 1] (1)
Equation 1 shows the difference between the current situations of households that
participated compared with what their situation would have been if they had not partic-
ipated. The first term, E[Y 1i |Pi = 1], is fully observable because it represents the results
given household participation. The second term, E[Y 0i |Pi = 1] presents a problem because
when the household participates (Pi = 1), Y
1
i is the variable that can be observed. Fur-
thermore, with the information provided by non-participating households, E[Y 0i |Pi = 0]
can be obtained, so the equation ATT cannot be solved with data observed in the same
household.
The solution proposed through the matching methodology is based on the assump-
tion that, given a set of observable characteristics X, the potential outcomes (when not
participating) are independent of the state of participation (conditional independence as-
sumption, CIA): Y 0i ⊥Pi|X. Therefore, after controlling for observable differences, the
average potential outcome is the same for P = 1 and P = 0, that is, E[Y 0i |P = 1, X] =
E[Y 0i |P = 0, X]. This enables the use of a control group. 6
Instead of matching based on X, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest using the
household propensity to participate to reduce the dimensionality of the problem. This
propensity, which can be influenced by a large number of factors, is reduced to a scalar
p(X) called ”propensity score, PS”. In formal terms, the PS is defined as the conditional
probability of participating given a group of individual characteristics (X = xi) for each
6Authors quote no. 3 in text.
household:
p(x)≡Pr(Pi = 1|X = xi) (2)
After calculating the PS using a probabilistic model, various methods can be used to
estimate the average effect of treatment on the treated, including:
• Nearest Neighbor Matching: This method carries out the matching by looking
in each of the treated units for a unit in the control group whose PS is closest. That
is, the j untreated unit is chosen to be the control group (C(pi)) of the i treated
unit to minimize the difference between PS:
C(i) = minj[|Pi − Pj|] (3)
• Radius Matching: This method uses all control units within a predefined radius
of the PS, which is an advantage because it allows a larger number of control units
in case there is not an appropriate match. The equation indicates that the treated
unit i is matched to the control unit j such that:
δ > |pi − pj| = mink∈{D=0}|pi − pk| (4)
where δ > 0 is a specified radius. 7.
• Kernel Matching: This methodology matches the benefit-receiving households
with a weighted average of the control households that are closest, with weights
that are inversely proportional to the distance between the propensity scores of the







K[(P (Xi)− P (Xj))/aN0]∑p
j=1K[(P (Xi)− P (Xj))/aN0]
7For more details, see ?.
where aN0 is a band or smoothing parameter and K(·) is the kernel function of the
difference between the PS of the participants and of the control group. 8.
To quantify the impact of participation in the program on labor market outcomes, we
use the estimate of the difference of the ATT , which can be used to compare the situations
of participating and not-participating households.
Let t be the period after the receipt of remittances and t′ be the period before remit-
tances; the estimation of the difference of the ATT is given by:
E(Y 1it − Y 0it |Pi = 1, X)− E(Y 0it − Y 0it |Pi = 0, X) (6)
This indicator compares the results of the treatment group and the control group
(first difference) before and after treatment (second difference), eliminating unobservable
constant effects over time.
3 Data and Information from the Survey
In 2004, the Dominican Republic implemented the Solidaridad program to raise the human
capital (health and education) of families living in poverty. This program provides cash
assistance, subject to compliance by the participants with certain requirements, and aims
to address problems related to poor levels of education, malnutrition and infant mortality,
among others. Participants in this program are subject to strict monitoring control to
ensure that they continue to meet the requirements that give them access to benefits.
The Solidaridad program consists of two main components: (i) a health component and
(ii) an education component.
The health component aims to address issues of family health problems, malnutrition
and infant mortality, among others, through food and nutritional education and interven-
tions focused on children from poor families. In the program, households must follow a
series of specific protocols (e.g., vaccination plans for children, periodic checks for pregnant
8I´dem
women, etc.) to obtain the transfer called ”Comer es Primero”. This transfer grants the
household RD$700 pesos ($18 U.S. dollars) per month to heads of households in extreme
and moderate poverty; the money must be used exclusively for the purchase of food.
The education component, or School Attendance Incentive (ILAE), consists of an in-
kind transfer to beneficiary households with children between the ages of six and sixteen
who are enrolled in basic education between first and eighth grade. Such transfers can
only be used to purchase school supplies, books, uniforms and medicine. The amount
transferred depends on the number of eligible children in the home and is set according
to the following scale:
• Households with one or two elegible children = RD$300.00
• Households with three elegible children = RD$450.00
• Households with four or more elegible children = RD$600.00
In 2010, the Inter-American Development Bank, in alliance with the Office of Social
Policy Coordination (GASO) and the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic, made
available to the public the new Evaluation of Social Security survey (EEPS), which cov-
ered 2,796 households, of which 52% were beneficiaries of charitable programs. This
instrument collects the socioeconomic characteristics of the interviewed households and a
significant number of other indicators for evaluation of the impact of social programs on
the Dominican labor market.
3.1 Labor Market and Income Cycle
The evolution of the labor market indicators and in particular the levels of employment
and real income closely reflect the behavior of the Dominican economic cycle. For example,
in 2000, approximately 486,000 workers (13.9% of the labor force) were unemployed. By
October 2004, after the financial crisis, the number of unemployed individuals exceeded
796,000, a figure that took the unemployment rate to the highest level of the decade
(19.7%). By 2011, after a period of significant economic recovery, the unemployment rate
stood at 14.6%.
As could be predicted, income figures underwent the reverse behavior in comparison to
the unemployment rate: when labor supply is high (many unemployed workers), income
falls. In the 2000-2004 period, the real hourly income of workers was reduced by almost
40% (especially in the crisis years 2003-2004). Real incomes recovered in subsequent
years. However, in 2010, real incomes were still approximately 20% below their levels at
the beginning of the decade.
As for the distribution of the Dominican labor force among the productive sectors,
we can say that it has changed significantly over the past five decades. The agricultural
sector has lost importance in job creation by reducing the percentage of individuals in the
employed labor force from 73% in 1960 to less than 35% by the end of the 1980s. Since
1990, the Dominican economy has acquired a model of employment generation oriented
to a service economy (e.g., tourism, trade and public administration).
One of the main characteristics of the Dominican labor market is its concentration
in the informal sector. In the last decade, the share of informal workers has fluctuated
approximately 54%, significantly increasing to 56.6% by the end of 2011. However, the
large number of workers in this sector only indicates ”the existence of a large proportion
of small productive units” (Guzma´n, 2011) because, contrary to popular opinion, the
definition of informality does not necessarily relate to aspects of precariousness or illegality.
In the case of the Dominican Republic, the National Workforce Survey defines informal
workers as those employees working in businesses with less than five employees as well
as unpaid workers, the self-employed, domestic service workers and bosses belonging to
non-industrial economic sectors. 9
9These bosses are in the following occupational groups: farming, operators and drivers, artisans and
laborers, merchants, salesmen and unskilled workers.
4 Estimates and Results
One of the main problems with conditional transfer programs is their potential to affect
the labor market through labor supply disincentives. For example, a conditional cash
transfer program can affect a household’s budget constraints, allowing the substitution
of leisure for work while still consuming the same basket of goods. Consequently, the
benefits received from transfers can potentially generate incentives to reduce labor market
participation and affect wages. Additionally, potential program enrollees could adjust
their participation in the workforce and become inactive in their job searches.
Given the characteristics of the survey and to fully exploit its information, we choose
the individual as the unit of analysis. To isolate the effect of the Solidaridad program
on the Dominican Republic’s labor market, households with at least one member par-
ticipating in the program are assigned to the treatment group. This strategy allows us
to identify the direct effects of the program on households and on individuals; the logic
behind this estimate is that the behavior of individuals is a function of the household’s
behavior.
Although the survey does not allow the identification of a baseline period, its design
does allow the generation of a control group. In fact, the survey takes a representative
selection of beneficiary households identified as the intervention group and matches it
with a set of households with similar conditions that for administrative reasons have
not been incorporated into the program. While this strategy can correct the potential
contamination of the control group, we additionally compile a set of structural variables
(covariates) that simultaneously affect the implementation of the program (treatment)
and are variables that affect labor market indicators (outcomes), as the literature has
proven. These structural variables seek to correct biases that may exist. In the absence
of a baseline, it is plausible that the selected variables are relatively stable over time and
are not directly affected by the program. These variables are used in the analysis to
control the observable differences among individuals who are affected by the Solidaridad
program and those who are not, thus isolating the impact of transfers. Control variables
are placed into three groups that capture demographic, human capital and household
characteristics. For demographic controls, we include gender (dummy = 1 if female),
age and age squared. For human capital variables, we include years of education (and
its square) and a dummy to indicate whether the participant can read and/or write.
We also determine the interaction between age and education. Finally, for household
characteristics, we include whether the individual is the head of the household, whether
he/she is married, the household size (number of people), the number of adults of working
age (age 18-64) and the number of seniors (age 65 or more). We also include as controls
the number of infants in the household (age 0-5) and the number of school age children
(age 6-16). Because the presence of children affects women’s decisions to work or look
for work, the interaction between ”number of infants” and the woman dummy variable is
included.
Outcome variables for the labor market are evaluated by taking into account three
main components. First, the probability of finding a job is defined as a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 if the person is working and 0 if unemployed. This variable
measures the effect of the programs on the possibility that participants are working.
Because the programs do not directly affect the creation of new jobs, the impact of this
variable is expected to be minimal. Because the definition of wage employment includes
the self-employed, it is possible that many of the observed effects are generated through
this channel. The second outcome variable is the probability of entering the labor market
from inactivity, which is defined using a dummy with value 1 if the individual is employed
or unemployed, and 0 if the individual is inactive. This variable is intended to directly
capture the effects of the program.
Although there are different methods of propensity score matching to choose from,
our specification is based on the method with the best balance for our control variables.
Therefore, we use the nearest-neighbor methodology (in terms of the distribution of the
control variables) because it provides the best balance and is more likely to satisfy the
CIA. This estimate allows replacement (which generally reduces bias but could increase
the variance (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002)) during the stop.
Additionally, we estimate robust standard errors following Abadie and Imbens (2006).
Our specification seeks to find individuals unaffected by the program who are observably
similar to individuals affected by it, isolating only the remaining variation between the
treatments related to the program. This method allows the use of an ATT estimator
that is as unbiased as possible. An important feature of our matching estimator is its
transparency because it allows the identification of average labor market outcomes through
different programs.
4.1 Main Results
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics from the sample; these statistics are close to
those that represent the official Dominican Republic statistics. While the Solidaridad
program components do not cover the entire universe of potential beneficiaries, programs
such as CEP and Bono Gas reach more than half of the population. Within the sample,
we observe parameters that complement those in the Dominican Republic and are similar
to those in the Latin American region. About half of the sample is female (49%), which
follows the official statistics. The level of literacy of the sample reaches 82%, the average
age is 33 years, the average household size is 4-5 members and approximately 13% of the
sample experience extreme poverty. While the extreme poverty indicator is higher than
expected, the result is justified by the sample and the program objectives.
Following Imbens and Abadie (2006) and Canavire-Bacarreza and Hanauer (2012), the
main criterion for the choice of the best estimator is the balance between the control group
and the treatment group. Table 2 presents the results of balance between the groups for
the preferred estimator (Kernel matching). The differences between the treatment group
and the control group in the structural variables are not significant.
Table 3 presents the main results of the matching. In general, the results show het-
erogeneous effects on the labor market of the various Solidaridad program components.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Observ. Media Desv. Est. Min Max
CEP 9963 0.5217 0.4996 0.00 1.00
ILAES 9963 0.1933 0.3949 0.00 1.00
Bono Gas 9963 0.7142 0.4518 0.00 1.00
Female 9963 0.4915 0.5000 0.00 1.00
Literate 9963 0.8287 0.3768 0.00 1.00
Age 9963 33.6590 21.7703 6.00 99.00
Age2 9963 16.0683 18.6547 0.36 98.01
Schooling 9963 5.6918 4.1551 0.00 19.00
Schooling2 9963 49.6590 55.2134 0.00 361.00
Schooling X Age 9963 170.4910 158.4612 0.00 1216.00
Head of Household 9963 0.2764 0.4473 0.00 1.00
Hosehold Size 9963 4.8498 1.9455 1.00 10.00
# Adults 18-65 9963 2.4828 1.3160 0.00 8.00
# Adults 65+ 9963 0.3861 0.6577 0.00 4.00
Married 9963 0.3581 0.4795 0.00 1.00
# Children 0-5 9963 0.4162 0.6969 0.00 4.00
# Children 6-15 9963 1.2916 1.2071 0.00 4.00
Female x # Child 0-5 9963 0.2222 0.5551 0.00 4.00
Extreme Poverty 9963 0.1607 0.3673 0.00 1.00
Note. Data obtained by the authors from the survey.
In general, the implementation of the program has slightly negative effects (although re-
duced) on the labor market, which suggests that although there is an income effect of the
program, it tends to be small in terms of the labor market.
The programs focused on children, such as Comer es Primero and the school attendance
incentive program, have negative (although small) effects on earnings and participation
in the labor force. Given the size of the Solidaridad program effects on labor market
outcomes, it is possible to argue that the program has not had a significant impact in
terms of reduction in the labor supply. These results are in line with those found in
other studies (Ribas and Soares, 2011; Borraz and Gonzales, 2009; Rodriguez and Freije,
2011). However, our results differ significantly in that we find a small, positive effect of
labor force participation from the program. This fact leads us to carefully analyze the
heterogeneous effects that the program may have.
The results of the program components that are targeted directly to households, such
as Bono Gas, show the same trend as the programs aimed at children. The results
show positive (but not significant) effects on income, and negative and small effects on
participation in the labor market and individuals’ desire to work (job search).
4.2 Robustness and Heterogeneity of the Effects
Next, we check the robustness of our main estimator. First, we evaluate the sensitivity
of the estimator to unobserved heterogeneity between households that received treatment
and those that did not receive treatment by applying Rosenbaum bands. The aim of
this strategy is to identify how much the selected groups should differ (treatment and
control) to cancel the results in terms of the labor market. Second, we evaluate the
robustness of our estimators to changes in the control group by using placebo groups that
seek to imitate the treatment group. Additionally, one of the main questions to assess the
impact of conditional cash transfer policies on the labor market lies in the heterogeneity
of the effects across different groups (although this question goes beyond the scope of this
document, it can provide insight into the different effects that may exist). We review the
effects through different cohorts of age, sex and geographic area.
4.2.1 Internal Robustness of the Matching Specification
In any observational study, the ability to remove the bias associated with nonrandom se-
lection is limited by the understanding of the underlying selection process (Meyer, 1995).
The selection process should be analyzed from factors that can be observed and obtained.
If the selection and results processes are systematically determined only through observ-
able characteristics (that are controlled), then the treatment effect obtained through a
matching estimate that provides the right balance will be unbiased and consistent. How-
ever, if there are unobservable characteristics that are uncorrelated with observable char-
acteristics that can be controlled but also contribute to the selection and results, then the
estimates may be biased. The survey provides sufficient structural factors that control
the unobserved heterogeneity bias. However, we evaluate the sensitivity of our estimators
to unobserved heterogeneity or bias using Rosenbaum bands (Rosenbaum, 2002).
Sensitivity analysis of Rosenbaum bands measures the level of unobserved heterogene-
ity necessary to undermine the results of the matching process. If a large (small) amount
of heterogeneity is necessary to weaken the significance of the results, then the results
are relatively robust (sensitive). Table 9 in the Appendix indicates that the level of un-
observed heterogeneity (not considered) that would nullify the results is 10%. In other
words, the results are robust regarding potential unobserved heterogeneity.
4.2.2 External robustness of the matching specification through placebo anal-
ysis
In our main specification, as well as in the heterogeneity analysis, we show that the Sol-
idaridad program generally has a negative effect (although small) on the labor market.
However, it may be that this result is a consequence of our inability to select a control
group that reflects the treatment group closely enough. To evaluate this potential prob-
lem, we apply a placebo analysis. The objective of this analysis is to evaluate whether our
set of variables (covariates) behaves appropriately to the construction of a counterfactual
for households that are similar (in mean) but do not receive treatment. In other words,
the placebo analysis evaluates whether the differences are due to other factors outside
the program. If the program was the only remaining source of variation across the treat-
ments, then we should not observe a significant difference between the placebo group and
the other controls. In this sense, the placebo is evaluated with two different strategies.
First, we generate two different control groups that are contrasted with the treatment
group. Second, we select a placebo group (within the control group) that is similar to the
originally treated group and we run the same specification, assigning the placebo group as
treated, in a procedure similar to the main analysis. This group is similar to the treated
group with the exception that the Solidaridad program did not affect the placebo group.
Consequently, if the variables capture the labor market trajectories correctly, we should
not observe significant differences between the groups. The results in Table 10 of the
Appendix show the different placebo strategies and demonstrate that there is no placebo
effect in the estimates. In other words, our set of variables seems to predict the trajectory
of labor market results relatively well.
4.2.3 Heterogeneity of the results
While the results found in the main estimation show small but negative effects of the
Solidaridad program on the labor market, there is a possibility that these effects are
different for different groups. It is therefore necessary to analyze the heterogeneity, and
although such an analysis goes beyond the objective of this document, it can identify
some parameters for program evaluation.
Observing Tables 4 through 7, it is confirmed that the effects are slightly higher for
the ILAE in relation to the other two programs. The positive employment effect is greater
for the most vulnerable groups (young and old) in relation to the rest of the adults (Table
4). Additionally, the effects on wages are higher in these groups, demonstrating the
vulnerability of these sectors. The overall results are in line with those found in the main
estimation, emphasizing a slightly negative effect on the probability of the program for
the older working group. When examining the results by gender, Table 5 shows that the
programs have a greater impact on women, particularly in relation to Bono Gas. This
result is expected because other studies have shown a greater income effect in developing
countries. When evaluating the effect by geographical area, we observe that the ILAE
tends to have a negative effect in terms of the probability of being employed in urban
areas, but not the other two components of the Solidaridad program (Table 7). In general,
the effects on participation in the labor market and on wages are higher in rural areas,
which is in line with the previous literature.
5 Conclusions
In 2004, the Dominican Republic implemented the Solidaridad program to increase the
human capital (health and education) of families living in poverty. The program has two
main components, health and education, and it attempts to reduce the problems related
to poor education, malnutrition and infant mortality through the provision of incentives
for the affected population through the sub-programs Comer es Primero, ILAE, and Bono
Gas. The objective of this study is the evaluation of the impact of the Solidaridad program
on the decisions of enrolled individuals to participate in the workforce.
The estimation methodology is based on matching estimates, which enables us to
discern the impact on beneficiary households and non-beneficiaries. The robustness of
the estimates is reviewed through three different methodologies: (i) Rosenbaum bands
sensitivity analysis, (ii) placebo strategies and (iii) analysis of the heterogeneity of the
results. In the first case, the results are robust to potential unobserved heterogeneity.
Furthermore, the different placebo strategies show that there is no placebo effect in the
estimations, meaning that our set of variables seems to predict the trajectory of labor
market outcomes. Finally, the estimates show some heterogeneity in their effects in that
those sectors of the population who are most vulnerable, such as children and young
adults, are most affected.
In general, the implementation of the program has negative effects of a small magnitude
on the labor market. This result means that while it is true that individuals reduce their
labor supply due to the income effect of the program, the impact is small relative to
the Dominican labor market. More specifically, we observe that the programs Comer
es Primero and the school attendance incentive program (ILAE) have negative effects
on income and participation in the labor force. However, given the magnitude of the
effect, combined with the size and coverage of the Solidaridad program, we think that the
program has not had a significant impact in terms of reduction of the labor supply in the
market. Additionally, the results of the program components that are targeted directly to
households, such as Bono Gas, show the same trend as the programs aimed at children:
positive (but not significant) on labor income and negative and small on participation in
the labor market and individuals’ desire to work (job search).
Finally, the estimates show great heterogeneity in the results. Specifically, the effects
of the Solidaridad program are slightly higher in the ILAE component in relation to
the other two programs. Additionally, the positive effect on employment is higher for
groups of young and older adults compared to the other adult groups, and the negative
effect on wages is higher in these groups, illustrating the vulnerability of these sectors.
The reduction in labor supply is more significant for women relative to men and among



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: Matching Results
Evaluated Variable Sample Treatment Control Difference Std. Dev. t-test
Comer es Primero
Works Unmatch 0.878 0.845 0.033 0.01 3.205
Match 0.88 0.855 0.026 0.014 1.868
Wage Unmatch 8.201 8.404 -0.203 0.035 -5.856
Match 8.209 8.268 -0.059 0.044 -1.335
Desire to Work Unmatch 0.567 0.617 -0.05 0.011 -4.424
Match 0.569 0.594 -0.024 0.015 -1.651
ILAES
Works Unmatch 0.878 0.845 0.033 0.01 3.205
Match 0.88 0.855 0.026 0.014 1.868
Wage Unmatch 8.201 8.404 -0.203 0.035 -5.856
Match 8.209 8.268 -0.059 0.044 -1.335
Desire to Work Unmatch 0.567 0.617 -0.05 0.011 -4.424
Match 0.569 0.594 -0.024 0.015 -1.651
Bono Gas
Works Unmatch 0.878 0.845 0.033 0.01 3.205
Match 0.88 0.855 0.026 0.014 1.868
Wage Unmatch 8.201 8.404 -0.203 0.035 -5.856
Match 8.209 8.268 -0.059 0.044 -1.335
Desire to Work Unmatch 0.567 0.617 -0.05 0.011 -4.424
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Table 8: Conditional Cash Transfer Programs in Latin America and the Caribbean
Country Programs Operating Country Programs Operating
(Year Started) (Year Started)
Argentina Asignacion Universal por Hijo
para proteccion social (2009);
Programa Ciudadania Portena
(2005)
Bolivia Bono Juancito Pinto (2006);
Bono Madre Nino-Nina (2009)
Brasil Bolsa Familia (2003) Chile Chile Solidario
Colombia Familias en Accion (2001);
Red Juntos (2007); Subsidios
Asistencia Escolar (2005)
Costa Rica Avancemos (2006)
Ecuador Bono de Desarrollo Humano
(2003)
El Salvador Comunidades Solidarias Ru-
rales (2005)
Guatemala Mi Familia Progresa (2008) Honduras Programa de Asignacion Fa-
miliar (1990); Bono 10.000
Educacion, Salud y Nutricion
(2010)
Jamaica Programa de Avance Salud y
Educacion (2002)
Mexico Oportunidades (1997)
Panama Red de Oportunidades (2006) Paraguay Tekopora (2005); Abrazo
(2005)












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Female 5.52 7.44 1.34 7.49 5.71 0.63 7.48 6.56 1.23
Literate 0.04 2.34 2.54 3.61 3.53 1.13 3.74 3.69 1.01
Age 7.78 5.97 0.03 6.69 3.34 0.07 7.77 4.15 1.00
Age^2 7.03 5.05 1.09 6.47 2.93 0.16 7.67 3.86 0.85
Schooling 0.98 1.89 0.69 0.60 0.04 1.52 1.17 0.42 0.80
Schooling^2 1.84 3.52 1.22 1.72 1.23 1.42 2.29 0.74 0.65
Schooling X Age 4.65 3.42 0.90 3.36 2.71 1.09 3.55 3.61 0.86
Head of Household 8.35 4.78 0.63 4.95 4.58 0.07 5.14 4.24 0.89
Household Size 3.15 3.43 2.49 1.55 3.29 1.76 0.85 3.69 1.64
# Adults 18‐65 6.36 3.85 0.53 2.99 3.33 1.73 2.37 3.61 1.66
# Seniors 65+ 4.78 1.67 2.18 2.92 2.12 2.33 2.78 2.24 1.99
Married 4.84 2.23 0.12 2.13 1.93 0.33 2.72 2.58 0.09
# Children 0‐5 1.12 1.31 2.14 2.32 0.14 0.38 1.30 0.04 0.07
# Children 6‐15 2.03 0.95 1.80 2.41 1.98 0.75 2.19 2.02 0.55
Female x # Child 0‐5 8.32 2.04 0.86 7.66 1.12 0.55 6.52 1.14 0.29

















Female 7.57 6.50 1.20 6.10 8.36 1.34 2.66 0.90 0.26
Literate 3.35 3.50 0.85 1.89 0.40 5.92 0.51 0.70 0.27
Age 7.27 4.12 0.77 5.86 4.23 0.70 1.82 1.33 1.26
Age^2 7.13 3.76 0.54 5.18 3.19 1.52 2.90 2.36 2.01
Schooling 1.09 0.26 0.81 0.46 2.07 0.44 5.12 4.52 2.68
Schooling^2 2.12 0.90 0.75 0.65 3.80 1.15 3.72 3.08 1.42
Schooling X Age 3.22 3.46 0.67 4.36 2.55 0.37 3.63 3.87 2.05
Head of Household 4.83 3.99 0.84 5.97 4.35 1.89 1.54 2.09 0.80
Household Size 1.39 3.60 1.49 0.49 4.36 3.43 19.98 18.31 16.15
# Adults 18‐65 2.57 3.70 1.55 3.28 5.43 1.17 7.05 7.40 7.00
# Seniors 65+ 3.27 2.84 2.30 7.13 1.47 2.95 9.29 7.47 7.26
Married 2.63 2.11 0.09 2.77 0.22 0.54 2.16 1.05 0.20
# Children 0‐5 1.18 0.07 0.28 1.22 1.09 2.83 5.34 5.97 4.75
# Children 6‐15 1.46 1.79 0.75 0.91 0.12 1.11 14.50 12.55 9.29
Female x # Child 0‐5 6.43 1.44 0.50 9.11 2.16 1.19 2.96 3.36 2.87

















Female 1.67 3.42 1.78 6.67 5.15 1.50 9.04 5.52 0.98
Literate 4.45 8.36 1.26 5.90 6.33 0.94 4.15 5.38 0.09
Age 9.66 10.46 1.85 13.34 12.13 1.33 11.83 10.38 0.84
Age^2 8.98 8.19 2.14 13.42 10.55 1.25 11.89 9.02 1.06
Schooling 4.39 6.13 2.35 8.89 6.74 1.20 8.31 7.85 0.04
Schooling^2 3.02 3.71 3.24 7.43 5.38 2.51 7.60 7.24 0.42
Schooling X Age 0.67 0.03 1.61 4.32 0.85 0.97 3.46 1.45 0.16
Head of Household 7.34 12.88 2.72 7.58 8.53 1.90 8.16 9.21 2.08
Household Size 9.24 6.50 6.70 9.81 3.27 3.92 11.74 4.99 4.95
# Adults 18‐65 9.22 5.93 6.89 8.52 1.69 3.50 10.43 3.70 3.86
# Seniors 65+ 0.23 2.31 0.46 3.27 4.47 1.21 0.36 1.92 0.00
Married 5.19 2.16 3.89 1.54 0.44 2.29 3.10 0.81 2.50
# Children 0‐5 0.24 2.92 2.47 0.73 4.04 0.05 0.20 2.04 0.35
# Children 6‐15 4.93 2.07 2.94 5.61 0.38 1.67 4.34 0.22 2.12
Female x # Child 0‐5 3.21 1.64 5.15 2.03 6.14 0.77 3.14 4.34 0.21

















Female 8.90 5.73 0.86 0.39 2.35 1.55 1.43 0.83 0.15
Literate 3.58 5.54 0.20 3.73 7.77 1.24 0.36 0.34 0.00
Age 11.25 10.13 0.49 11.17 12.22 1.45 0.19 0.30 1.12
Age^2 11.31 8.82 0.67 10.25 9.73 1.60 0.02 0.55 1.48
Schooling 7.08 7.19 0.59 4.37 6.69 2.08 5.06 3.52 2.75
Schooling^2 6.40 6.45 1.03 2.73 3.60 3.35 4.31 2.64 1.81
Schooling X Age 2.62 1.22 0.49 1.03 0.42 0.86 3.40 1.86 1.47
Head of Household 7.87 9.61 2.07 6.78 11.98 1.97 0.81 0.54 0.00
Household Size 11.27 4.70 4.41 10.75 9.17 8.24 22.69 22.44 18.13
# Adults 18‐65 9.49 3.25 3.25 10.52 6.96 6.93 7.26 6.97 3.83
# Seniors 65+ 0.14 2.38 0.12 0.44 2.36 0.90 2.88 4.53 4.64
Married 2.77 0.32 2.51 5.88 0.44 3.73 0.81 0.27 0.30
# Children 0‐5 0.09 1.89 0.57 0.19 5.81 0.83 8.30 8.06 5.87
# Children 6‐15 4.76 0.60 2.14 5.46 3.55 4.00 19.84 19.52 16.21
Female x # Child 0‐5 2.86 4.35 0.48 2.09 4.54 3.02 2.57 3.54 3.37

















Female 0.07 2.72 0.90 1.47 1.33 0.02 1.35 0.95 0.02
Literate 2.49 3.74 0.01 0.55 0.70 0.83 0.22 2.23 1.26
Age 0.95 3.74 0.17 0.65 0.04 0.42 2.31 0.88 0.63
Age^2 0.28 4.69 0.09 0.59 1.03 0.06 1.46 0.09 0.82
Schooling 3.12 3.09 1.20 3.04 1.46 2.00 4.39 2.47 2.43
Schooling^2 1.61 3.54 0.42 2.59 0.51 2.07 3.83 1.23 2.38
Schooling X Age 3.22 0.84 3.00 3.46 2.35 2.05 3.77 2.85 2.84
Head of Household 6.68 8.78 4.81 6.38 6.53 3.56 6.67 6.31 2.96
Household Size 3.75 2.07 0.15 1.55 0.16 0.40 1.77 0.53 0.34
# Adults 18‐65 7.66 0.28 1.65 4.63 0.99 0.99 5.06 1.55 1.95
# Seniors 65+ 0.81 1.79 0.76 0.36 1.28 2.16 0.17 0.87 3.16
Married 1.17 1.81 1.32 3.55 3.62 0.08 3.45 3.93 0.35
# Children 0‐5 1.37 1.89 0.71 1.80 2.45 2.22 1.77 1.77 1.61
# Children 6‐15 3.73 6.29 2.38 3.89 2.27 0.30 3.74 2.45 0.53
Female x # Child 0‐5 0.27 0.83 0.91 1.28 1.43 1.68 1.84 0.29 0.67

















Female 0.89 0.78 0.16 1.15 3.14 0.21 1.54 0.26 0.44
Literate 0.09 1.80 0.94 1.49 3.60 0.58 0.09 0.25 0.25
Age 1.29 0.14 0.42 0.08 4.62 0.40 2.55 1.68 1.63
Age^2 0.27 1.04 0.58 1.35 5.67 0.24 3.08 2.20 2.13
Schooling 3.18 1.46 1.62 4.45 2.96 1.82 1.79 1.39 1.43
Schooling^2 2.50 0.19 1.36 3.07 3.17 0.34 0.27 0.66 0.17
Schooling X Age 3.06 2.34 2.20 4.82 0.22 2.89 0.60 0.11 0.17
Head of Household 6.29 6.39 2.95 5.50 8.14 4.72 2.12 2.83 0.92
Household Size 0.98 0.33 0.05 4.65 1.37 0.64 20.92 18.83 16.82
# Adults 18‐65 4.65 1.20 1.69 8.43 0.84 2.13 10.17 9.77 9.02
# Seniors 65+ 0.04 1.03 3.17 0.78 2.28 1.06 10.41 8.95 7.73
Married 3.62 3.57 0.50 0.23 1.30 0.70 1.02 0.88 0.30
# Children 0‐5 2.33 2.26 1.91 0.88 1.82 0.74 3.97 4.89 4.70
# Children 6‐15 4.34 3.28 0.45 3.42 3.79 1.88 13.00 10.89 7.99
Female x # Child 0‐5 1.38 0.05 0.84 1.08 0.56 0.69 2.20 2.96 3.14









work (not in the workforce) For the rest of the analysis Kernel matching is used as selected methodology
Kernel Matching Local linear regression Mahalanobis 






Female 0.07 2.72 0.90 1.47 1.33 0.02 1.35 0.95 0.02
Literate 2.49 3.74 0.01 0.55 0.70 0.83 0.22 2.23 1.26
Age 0.95 3.74 0.17 0.65 0.04 0.42 2.31 0.88 0.63
Age^2 0.28 4.69 0.09 0.59 1.03 0.06 1.46 0.09 0.82
Schooling 3.12 3.09 1.20 3.04 1.46 2.00 4.39 2.47 2.43
Schooling^2 1.61 3.54 0.42 2.59 0.51 2.07 3.83 1.23 2.38
Schooling X Age 3.22 0.84 3.00 3.46 2.35 2.05 3.77 2.85 2.84
Head of Household 6.68 8.78 4.81 6.38 6.53 3.56 6.67 6.31 2.96
Household Size 3.75 2.07 0.15 1.55 0.16 0.40 1.77 0.53 0.34
# Adults 18‐65 7.66 0.28 1.65 4.63 0.99 0.99 5.06 1.55 1.95
# Seniors 65+ 0.81 1.79 0.76 0.36 1.28 2.16 0.17 0.87 3.16
Married 1.17 1.81 1.32 3.55 3.62 0.08 3.45 3.93 0.35
# Children 0‐5 1.37 1.89 0.71 1.80 2.45 2.22 1.77 1.77 1.61
# Children 6‐15 3.73 6.29 2.38 3.89 2.27 0.30 3.74 2.45 0.53
Female x # Child 0‐5 0.27 0.83 0.91 1.28 1.43 1.68 1.84 0.29 0.67

















Female 0.89 0.78 0.16 1.15 3.14 0.21 1.54 0.26 0.44
Literate 0.09 1.80 0.94 1.49 3.60 0.58 0.09 0.25 0.25
Age 1.29 0.14 0.42 0.08 4.62 0.40 2.55 1.68 1.63
Age^2 0.27 1.04 0.58 1.35 5.67 0.24 3.08 2.20 2.13
Schooling 3.18 1.46 1.62 4.45 2.96 1.82 1.79 1.39 1.43
Schooling^2 2.50 0.19 1.36 3.07 3.17 0.34 0.27 0.66 0.17
Schooling X Age 3.06 2.34 2.20 4.82 0.22 2.89 0.60 0.11 0.17
Head of Household 6.29 6.39 2.95 5.50 8.14 4.72 2.12 2.83 0.92
Household Size 0.98 0.33 0.05 4.65 1.37 0.64 20.92 18.83 16.82
# Adults 18‐65 4.65 1.20 1.69 8.43 0.84 2.13 10.17 9.77 9.02
# Seniors 65+ 0.04 1.03 3.17 0.78 2.28 1.06 10.41 8.95 7.73
Married 3.62 3.57 0.50 0.23 1.30 0.70 1.02 0.88 0.30
# Children 0‐5 2.33 2.26 1.91 0.88 1.82 0.74 3.97 4.89 4.70
# Children 6‐15 4.34 3.28 0.45 3.42 3.79 1.88 13.00 10.89 7.99
Female x # Child 0‐5 1.38 0.05 0.84 1.08 0.56 0.69 2.20 2.96 3.14














Sample Treatment Control Difference Std. Dev. t‐test
Works Unmatch 0.878 0.845 0.033 0.010 3.205
Match 0.880 0.845 0.035 0.017 2.129
Wage Unmatch 8.201 8.404 ‐0.203 0.035 ‐5.856
Match 8.209 8.265 ‐0.056 0.052 ‐1.074
Desire to Work Unmatch 0.567 0.617 ‐0.050 0.011 ‐4.424
Match 0.569 0.575 ‐0.005 0.017 ‐0.299
Works Unmatch 0.878 0.845 0.033 0.010 3.205
Match 0.880 0.859 0.021 0.014 1.550
Wage Unmatch 8.201 8.404 ‐0.203 0.035 ‐5.856
Match 8.209 8.264 ‐0.055 0.045 ‐1.246
Desire to Work Unmatch 0.567 0.617 ‐0.050 0.011 ‐4.424
Match 0.569 0.593 ‐0.023 0.015 ‐1.557
Works Unmatch 0.878 0.845 0.033 0.010 3.205
Match 0.880 0.855 0.025 0.014 1.833
Wage Unmatch 8.201 8.404 ‐0.203 0.035 ‐5.856
Match 8.209 8.267 ‐0.058 0.044 ‐1.313
Desire to Work Unmatch 0.567 0.617 ‐0.050 0.011 ‐4.424
Match 0.569 0.595 ‐0.026 0.015 ‐1.780
Works Unmatch 0.878 0.845 0.033 0.010 3.205
Match 0.880 0.855 0.026 0.014 1.868
Wage Unmatch 8.201 8.404 ‐0.203 0.035 ‐5.856
Match 8.209 8.268 ‐0.059 0.044 ‐1.335
Desire to Work Unmatch 0.567 0.617 ‐0.050 0.011 ‐4.424
Match 0.569 0.594 ‐0.024 0.015 ‐1.651
Works Unmatch 0.878 0.845 0.033 0.010 3.205
Match 0.878 . . . .
Wage Unmatch 8.201 8.404 ‐0.203 0.035 ‐5.856
Match 8.199 . . . .
Desire to Work Unmatch 0.567 0.617 ‐0.050 0.011 ‐4.424
Match 0.567 0.576 ‐0.009 . .
Works Unmatch 0.878 0.845 0.033 0.010 3.205
Match 0.878 0.860 0.018 0.016 1.156
Wage Unmatch 8.201 8.404 ‐0.203 0.035 ‐5.856
Match 8.201 8.330 ‐0.129 0.052 ‐2.463
Desire to Work Unmatch 0.567 0.617 ‐0.050 0.011 ‐4.424














Sample Treatment Control Difference Std. Dev. t‐test
Works Unmatch 0.878 0.845 0.033 0.010 3.205
Match 0.880 0.845 0.035 0.017 2.129
Wage Unmatch 8.201 8.404 ‐0.203 0.035 ‐5.856
Match 8.209 8.265 ‐0.056 0.052 ‐1.074
Desire to Work Unmatch 0.567 0.617 ‐0.050 0.011 ‐4.424
Match 0.569 0.575 ‐0.005 0.017 ‐0.299
Works Unmatch 0.878 0.845 0.033 0.010 3.205
Match 0.880 0.859 0.021 0.014 1.550
Wage Unmatch 8.201 8.404 ‐0.203 0.035 ‐5.856
Match 8.209 8.264 ‐0.055 0.045 ‐1.246
Desire to Work Unmatch 0.567 0.617 ‐0.050 0.011 ‐4.424
Match 0.569 0.593 ‐0.023 0.015 ‐1.557
Works Unmatch 0.878 0.845 0.033 0.010 3.205
Match 0.880 0.855 0.025 0.014 1.833
Wage Unmatch 8.201 8.404 ‐0.203 0.035 ‐5.856
Match 8.209 8.267 ‐0.058 0.044 ‐1.313
Desire to Work Unmatch 0.567 0.617 ‐0.050 0.011 ‐4.424
Match 0.569 0.595 ‐0.026 0.015 ‐1.780
Works Unmatch 0.878 0.845 0.033 0.010 3.205
Match 0.880 0.855 0.026 0.014 1.868
Wage Unmatch 8.201 8.404 ‐0.203 0.035 ‐5.856
Match 8.209 8.268 ‐0.059 0.044 ‐1.335
Desire to Work Unmatch 0.567 0.617 ‐0.050 0.011 ‐4.424
Match 0.569 0.594 ‐0.024 0.015 ‐1.651
Works Unmatch 0.878 0.845 0.033 0.010 3.205
Match 0.878 . . . .
Wage Unmatch 8.201 8.404 ‐0.203 0.035 ‐5.856
Match 8.199 . . . .
Desire to Work Unmatch 0.567 0.617 ‐0.050 0.011 ‐4.424
Match 0.567 0.576 ‐0.009 . .
Works Unmatch 0.878 0.845 0.033 0.010 3.205
Match 0.878 0.860 0.018 0.016 1.156
Wage Unmatch 8.201 8.404 ‐0.203 0.035 ‐5.856
Match 8.201 8.330 ‐0.129 0.052 ‐2.463
Desire to Work Unmatch 0.567 0.617 ‐0.050 0.011 ‐4.424














Sample Treatment Control Difference Std. Dev. t‐test
Works Unmatch 0.878 0.845 0.033 0.010 3.205
Match 0.880 0.845 0.035 0.017 2.129
Wage Unmatch 8.201 8.404 ‐0.203 0.035 ‐5.856
Match 8.209 8.265 ‐0.056 0.052 ‐1.074
Desire to Work Unmatch 0.567 0.617 ‐0.050 0.011 ‐4.424
Match 0.569 0.575 ‐0.005 0.017 ‐0.299
Works Unmatch 0.878 0.845 0.033 0.010 3.205
Match 0.880 0.859 0.021 0.014 1.550
Wage Unmatch 8.201 8.404 ‐0.203 0.035 ‐5.856
Match 8.209 8.264 ‐0.055 0.045 ‐1.246
Desire to Work Unmatch 0.567 0.617 ‐0.050 0.011 ‐4.424
Match 0.569 0.593 ‐0.023 0.015 ‐1.557
Works Unmatch 0.878 0.845 0.033 0.010 3.205
Match 0.880 0.855 0.025 0.014 1.833
Wage Unmatch 8.201 8.404 ‐0.203 0.035 ‐5.856
Match 8.209 8.267 ‐0.058 0.044 ‐1.313
Desire to Work Unmatch 0.567 0.617 ‐0.050 0.011 ‐4.424
Match 0.569 0.595 ‐0.026 0.015 ‐1.780
Works Unmatch 0.878 0.845 0.033 0.010 3.205
Match 0.880 0.855 0.026 0.014 1.868
Wage Unmatch 8.201 8.404 ‐0.203 0.035 ‐5.856
Match 8.209 8.268 ‐0.059 0.044 ‐1.335
Desire to Work Unmatch 0.567 0.617 ‐0.050 0.011 ‐4.424
Match 0.569 0.594 ‐0.024 0.015 ‐1.651
Works Unmatch 0.878 0.845 0.033 0.010 3.205
Match 0.878 . . . .
Wage Unmatch 8.201 8.404 ‐0.203 0.035 ‐5.856
Match 8.199 . . . .
Desire to Work Unmatch 0.567 0.617 ‐0.050 0.011 ‐4.424
Match 0.567 0.576 ‐0.009 . .
Works Unmatch 0.878 0.845 0.033 0.010 3.205
Match 0.878 0.860 0.018 0.016 1.156
Wage Unmatch 8.201 8.404 ‐0.203 0.035 ‐5.856
Match 8.201 8.330 ‐0.129 0.052 ‐2.463
Desire to Work Unmatch 0.567 0.617 ‐0.050 0.011 ‐4.424














Sample Treatment Control Difference Std. Dev. t‐test
Works Unmatch 0.878 0.845 0.033 0.010 3.205
Match 0.880 0.845 0.035 0.017 2.129
Wage Unmatch 8.201 8.404 ‐0.203 0.035 ‐5.856
Match 8.209 8.265 ‐0.056 0.052 ‐1.074
Desire to Work Unmatch 0.567 0.617 ‐0.050 0.011 ‐4.424
Match 0.569 0.575 ‐0.005 0.017 ‐0.299
Works Unmatch 0.878 0.845 0.033 0.010 3.205
Match 0.880 0.859 0.021 0.014 1.550
Wage Unmatch 8.201 8.404 ‐0.203 0.035 ‐5.856
Match 8.209 8.264 ‐0.055 0.045 ‐1.246
Desire to Work Unmatch 0.567 0.617 ‐0.050 0.011 ‐4.424
Match 0.569 0.593 ‐0.023 0.015 ‐1.557
Works Unmatch 0.878 0.845 0.033 0.010 3.205
Match 0.880 0.855 0.025 0.014 1.833
Wage Unmatch 8.201 8.404 ‐0.203 0.035 ‐5.856
Match 8.209 8.267 ‐0.058 0.044 ‐1.313
Desire to Work Unmatch 0.567 0.617 ‐0.050 0.011 ‐4.424
Match 0.569 0.595 ‐0.026 0.015 ‐1.780
Works Unmatch 0.878 0.845 0.033 0.010 3.205
Match 0.880 0.855 0.026 0.014 1.868
Wage Unmatch 8.201 8.404 ‐0.203 0.035 ‐5.856
Match 8.209 8.268 ‐0.059 0.044 ‐1.335
Desire to Work Unmatch 0.567 0.617 ‐0.050 0.011 ‐4.424
Match 0.569 0.594 ‐0.024 0.015 ‐1.651
Works Unmatch 0.878 0.845 0.033 0.010 3.205
Match 0.878 . . . .
Wage Unmatch 8.201 8.404 ‐0.203 0.035 ‐5.856
Match 8.199 . . . .
Desire to Work Unmatch 0.567 0.617 ‐0.050 0.011 ‐4.424
Match 0.567 0.576 ‐0.009 . .
Works Unmatch 0.878 0.845 0.033 0.010 3.205
Match 0.878 0.860 0.018 0.016 1.156
Wage Unmatch 8.201 8.404 ‐0.203 0.035 ‐5.856
Match 8.201 8.330 ‐0.129 0.052 ‐2.463
Desire to Work Unmatch 0.567 0.617 ‐0.050 0.011 ‐4.424




















Female 1.864 9.658 0.387 3.230 5.911 0.286 13.541 8.688 1.914
Literate 12.165 1.121 6.963 6.002 4.169 3.211 3.767 0.442 1.265
Age 13.190 6.170 0.612 1.412 2.975 0.662 31.219 9.732 3.447
Age^2 11.950 5.541 0.565 0.939 3.038 0.684 30.822 9.455 2.971
Schooling 5.872 4.213 3.423 1.577 0.867 1.527 1.088 2.390 5.505
Schooling^2 7.380 6.108 3.831 1.051 0.457 0.953 0.412 2.516 4.946
Schooling X Age 8.327 5.006 3.292 1.715 0.780 1.202 1.771 2.646 5.501
Head of Household 5.338 10.113 4.605 2.426 1.883 2.621 0.618 2.804 4.582
Household Size 4.879 1.230 1.688 1.655 5.605 2.826 2.811 17.472 6.407
# Adults 18‐65 16.123 0.969 3.263 1.658 4.417 4.074 8.327 3.970 2.726
# Seniors 65+ 5.684 8.290 2.857 2.992 1.771 0.845 5.664 5.435 0.076
Married 8.202 11.324 0.201 1.321 0.627 0.351 9.879 3.575 3.995
# Children 0‐5 4.967 5.507 7.033 2.965 1.476 2.488 9.514 14.339 7.108
# Children 6‐15 1.471 3.662 1.579 2.811 4.369 0.213 1.943 22.749 5.088
Female x # Child 0‐5 1.719 0.608 6.195 4.593 0.592 1.505 6.735 9.453 10.945










Female 11.903 2.928 0.291 1.688 1.874 0.829 17.162 9.025 7.646
Literate 10.054 5.807 0.598 5.471 2.080 1.950 21.645 7.203 2.585
Age 8.380 6.668 1.488 6.521 3.338 0.610 5.393 4.014 9.807
Age^2 6.767 4.559 1.036 6.183 3.272 0.534 4.792 4.418 9.310
Schooling 2.106 5.982 0.337 2.462 3.538 1.096 35.737 8.321 8.191
Schooling^2 3.124 8.561 1.410 1.745 3.778 1.353 46.738 21.193 11.622
Schooling X Age 5.074 8.219 0.286 3.193 4.433 0.792 37.176 7.396 7.353
Head of Household 11.953 17.236 5.867 8.826 6.089 1.723 18.061 3.070 4.649
Household Size 3.254 8.536 6.519 5.862 3.368 2.539 19.078 10.450 6.900
# Adults 18‐65 13.052 13.533 2.137 0.477 1.294 2.229 24.371 4.886 4.413
# Seniors 65+ 3.784 4.418 3.956 6.519 0.668 0.259 7.919 4.811 2.536
Married 5.920 10.161 2.094 2.533 0.230 1.928 3.479 6.574 5.259
# Children 0‐5 5.332 6.610 4.896 1.291 0.952 2.136 21.085 15.328 0.206
# Children 6‐15 19.452 27.564 0.104 4.406 5.483 2.190 2.139 10.682 11.063
Female x # Child 0‐5 1.120 5.959 0.052 5.965 4.359 2.201 4.631 14.862 1.119




















Female 10.643 1.840 3.559 0.055 0.358 0.872 5.879 5.177 11.479
Literate 8.980 1.277 4.526 6.399 4.430 2.122 16.197 5.959 5.248
Age 0.486 1.821 0.747 1.722 3.081 0.695 15.421 17.784 6.621
Age^2 0.112 2.896 0.662 2.279 3.718 0.667 14.876 17.530 6.782
Schooling 13.535 11.739 1.284 0.403 0.203 2.269 2.167 7.164 1.781
Schooling^2 12.862 13.532 0.369 0.585 0.336 2.570 2.735 3.295 0.767
Schooling X Age 12.634 10.422 1.588 0.299 0.344 2.244 1.897 6.813 0.987
Head of Household 10.474 20.310 1.023 5.114 5.786 3.400 13.945 8.119 6.858
Household Size 5.655 2.108 5.570 0.319 1.935 1.463 6.558 5.570 1.522
# Adults 18‐65 3.742 8.957 2.719 0.566 1.751 2.720 3.302 1.157 2.297
# Seniors 65+ 5.384 21.015 2.083 1.406 2.259 0.102 26.562 2.238 3.674
Married 7.500 5.144 0.840 4.112 0.958 1.673 6.786 2.250 5.493
# Children 0‐5 10.321 10.944 1.110 2.416 1.942 0.959 1.392 8.964 0.023
# Children 6‐15 2.815 6.341 2.842 3.436 3.968 1.037 3.927 6.890 0.147
Female x # Child 0‐5 16.171 10.232 1.936 3.183 0.096 0.447 24.163 8.924 3.536










Female 10.643 1.840 3.559 0.055 0.358 0.872 5.879 5.177 11.479
Literate 8.980 1.277 4.526 6.399 4.430 2.122 16.197 5.959 5.248
Age 0.486 1.821 0.747 1.722 3.081 0.695 15.421 17.784 6.621
Age^2 0.112 2.896 0.662 2.279 3.718 0.667 14.876 17.530 6.782
Schooling 13.535 11.739 1.284 0.403 0.203 2.269 2.167 7.164 1.781
Schooling^2 12.862 13.532 0.369 0.585 0.336 2.570 2.735 3.295 0.767
Schooling X Age 12.634 10.422 1.588 0.299 0.344 2.244 1.897 6.813 0.987
Head of Household 10.474 20.310 1.023 5.114 5.786 3.400 13.945 8.119 6.858
Household Size 5.655 2.108 5.570 0.319 1.935 1.463 6.558 5.570 1.522
# Adults 18‐65 3.742 8.957 2.719 0.566 1.751 2.720 3.302 1.157 2.297
# Seniors 65+ 5.384 21.015 2.083 1.406 2.259 0.102 26.562 2.238 3.674
Married 7.500 5.144 0.840 4.112 0.958 1.673 6.786 2.250 5.493
# Children 0‐5 10.321 10.944 1.110 2.416 1.942 0.959 1.392 8.964 0.023
# Children 6‐15 2.815 6.341 2.842 3.436 3.968 1.037 3.927 6.890 0.147
Female x # Child 0‐5 16.171 10.232 1.936 3.183 0.096 0.447 24.163 8.924 3.536

















Literate 1.714 1.643 0.374 3.073 8.035 6.093
Age 1.518 1.555 0.390 3.782 0.098 3.386
Age^2 0.969 1.968 0.195 3.158 0.554 3.333
Schooling 0.287 1.013 1.027 1.743 3.953 4.196
Schooling^2 2.046 0.810 1.140 3.505 1.521 3.896
Schooling X Age 0.318 0.371 0.140 5.449 2.529 3.539
Head of Household 2.292 0.434 0.974 0.800 1.127 0.457
Household Size 2.565 0.354 2.254 0.323 7.684 0.039
# Adults 18‐65 1.606 3.348 1.156 1.826 8.986 2.211
# Seniors 65+ 2.451 3.145 6.447 1.229 3.321 4.229
Married 2.007 3.552 4.226 4.979 7.535 2.019
# Children 0‐5 2.817 3.056 3.103 2.669 5.915 0.700
# Children 6‐15 5.096 3.158 5.135 1.345 2.443 0.170







Literate 4.254 1.757 1.851 11.860 12.652 4.050
Age 3.642 4.985 6.010 1.679 3.517 8.936
Age^2 4.094 5.321 6.111 0.889 3.040 8.764
Schooling 5.667 2.841 2.649 6.425 14.069 6.475
Schooling^2 6.023 2.227 2.402 7.910 12.503 6.388
Schooling X Age 6.254 3.649 4.556 6.516 12.460 2.503
Head of Household 3.092 3.129 0.217 3.533 1.228 0.971
Household Size 5.699 0.540 3.081 1.925 0.547 3.515
# Adults 18‐65 11.666 11.050 9.115 0.193 8.074 1.822
# Seniors 65+ 4.153 0.795 0.583 5.486 3.935 0.064
Married 1.253 1.250 2.253 1.841 3.518 0.727
# Children 0‐5 0.944 2.334 1.123 4.244 14.904 0.868
# Children 6‐15 7.106 11.551 7.214 4.634 0.636 7.970

















Literate 5.137 10.313 5.386 7.159 5.607 0.645
Age 6.628 3.084 4.492 0.399 2.963 1.223
Age^2 6.885 2.811 4.668 0.049 3.650 1.113
Schooling 2.243 0.102 1.277 6.829 2.290 0.707
Schooling^2 1.546 0.984 1.009 7.949 4.413 0.152
Schooling X Age 1.248 1.124 2.602 4.573 0.497 1.183
Head of Household 2.209 0.152 3.396 0.769 1.797 0.050
Household Size 1.261 0.555 1.256 0.583 0.000 1.939
# Adults 18‐65 3.363 1.153 5.360 6.194 2.452 0.931
# Seniors 65+ 4.033 1.272 4.726 5.512 11.043 1.131
Married 3.277 2.490 3.203 0.544 6.647 0.974
# Children 0‐5 0.444 1.201 1.475 3.938 5.231 1.574
# Children 6‐15 3.074 0.265 1.837 1.675 8.088 0.818







Literate 5.137 10.313 5.386 7.159 5.607 0.645
Age 6.628 3.084 4.492 0.399 2.963 1.223
Age^2 6.885 2.811 4.668 0.049 3.650 1.113
Schooling 2.243 0.102 1.277 6.829 2.290 0.707
Schooling^2 1.546 0.984 1.009 7.949 4.413 0.152
Schooling X Age 1.248 1.124 2.602 4.573 0.497 1.183
Head of Household 2.209 0.152 3.396 0.769 1.797 0.050
Household Size 1.261 0.555 1.256 0.583 0.000 1.939
# Adults 18‐65 3.363 1.153 5.360 6.194 2.452 0.931
# Seniors 65+ 4.033 1.272 4.726 5.512 11.043 1.131
Married 3.277 2.490 3.203 0.544 6.647 0.974
# Children 0‐5 0.444 1.201 1.475 3.938 5.231 1.574
# Children 6‐15 3.074 0.265 1.837 1.675 8.088 0.818

















Female 5.791 4.841 2.098 5.641 7.493 3.069 8.391 7.804 5.034
Literate 4.081 0.926 11.366 13.701 12.357 6.715 7.102 6.105 5.760
Age 0.435 10.373 5.753 1.784 0.748 2.564 2.012 2.445 0.801
Age^2 1.777 10.266 5.820 0.909 0.356 2.607 2.231 2.686 0.897
Schooling 2.631 0.026 3.535 7.568 8.415 7.532 4.121 4.542 4.083
Schooling^2 4.347 2.392 1.756 4.972 7.611 6.262 2.059 2.234 2.220
Schooling X Age 0.856 1.833 4.162 8.277 7.484 8.246 6.690 5.518 5.050
Head of Household 4.305 8.680 3.599 3.461 3.688 1.549 3.578 7.049 3.883
Household Size 3.555 1.723 8.150 3.631 9.744 2.380 11.484 10.788 4.013
# Adults 18‐65 0.913 4.724 3.174 2.885 9.407 4.297 5.662 5.571 1.002
# Seniors 65+ 7.137 4.656 8.560 7.051 8.799 7.200 0.026 1.992 1.677
Married 6.563 0.910 3.802 0.792 1.791 0.028 2.048 2.312 0.152
# Children 0‐5 7.256 7.188 1.441 5.996 1.664 1.268 8.294 7.926 0.202
# Children 6‐15 1.134 6.059 4.371 1.929 0.025 4.384 8.813 5.331 3.755
Female x # Child 0‐5 3.911 6.251 1.616 11.791 5.070 4.125 1.922 0.778 5.418
Extreme Poverty 1.164 1.170 1.675 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.873 0.346 0.543






Female 10.950 0.901 1.237 11.786 13.015 3.591 15.209 10.543 2.923
Literate 15.380 21.593 1.767 8.758 1.447 9.207 10.392 8.182 0.161
Age 0.553 4.914 4.513 15.014 8.027 5.302 5.759 6.893 3.729
Age^2 1.200 2.972 4.466 13.941 7.789 5.355 5.369 6.295 3.705
Schooling 8.377 9.919 4.895 6.095 5.661 0.583 4.492 8.976 1.698
Schooling^2 5.100 4.408 3.642 8.466 3.216 0.167 4.239 8.318 2.221
Schooling X Age 7.030 8.817 4.582 3.039 7.825 0.173 2.121 5.636 5.556
Head of Household 4.605 3.375 5.606 18.030 18.755 10.552 1.968 3.949 0.043
Household Size 5.694 2.532 1.099 11.986 6.365 4.956 12.943 11.661 7.730
# Adults 18‐65 9.533 7.591 0.334 13.028 6.538 4.433 14.335 14.422 12.591
# Seniors 65+ 9.285 9.609 1.604 2.582 3.881 1.654 1.849 0.638 5.045
Married 9.004 5.202 7.896 6.270 2.816 1.097 4.136 2.570 1.346
# Children 0‐5 16.598 9.464 1.857 7.075 8.904 7.218 0.216 4.334 3.279
# Children 6‐15 4.595 2.595 2.284 2.611 1.403 0.654 1.594 3.260 5.318
Female x # Child 0‐5 10.930 1.825 2.091 10.893 10.753 5.853 8.593 11.736 3.776













Female 5.611 0.826 0.829 4.026 4.156 0.301 3.377 5.918 3.446
Literate 1.318 1.731 5.299 4.701 3.100 0.189 5.990 0.533 1.429
Age 14.139 15.084 7.811 3.103 2.515 0.225 1.216 1.989 1.960
Age^2 14.792 14.665 8.495 2.077 2.204 0.235 0.700 2.101 1.059
Schooling 7.677 2.534 0.938 8.552 5.884 5.574 5.064 1.028 1.455
Schooling^2 6.299 5.304 0.353 7.455 5.545 6.360 4.212 1.640 1.124
Schooling X Age 5.736 2.158 3.522 7.477 6.326 5.058 3.589 0.002 4.734
Head of Household 8.938 11.082 10.095 6.470 6.655 1.179 1.676 1.379 0.451
Household Size 7.250 13.823 6.795 1.231 6.042 3.250 5.488 4.066 1.712
# Adults 18‐65 3.829 7.686 0.102 0.354 10.811 2.642 4.798 4.338 2.595
# Seniors 65+ 11.655 14.116 4.246 8.055 12.230 3.279 2.217 2.259 1.621
Married 6.901 4.363 3.520 6.064 6.799 1.202 0.617 2.733 1.768
# Children 0‐5 2.104 3.004 5.082 0.164 0.522 2.491 3.582 3.675 2.969
# Children 6‐15 16.447 18.518 8.392 0.433 2.109 0.831 5.381 3.265 0.230
Female x # Child 0‐5 2.502 5.271 5.487 1.455 5.049 1.124 4.522 4.832 2.391
Extreme Poverty 7.442 0.113 3.782 0.484 0.488 0.258 4.032 0.611 4.619






Female 5.611 0.826 0.829 4.026 4.156 0.301 3.377 5.918 3.446
Literate 1.318 1.731 5.299 4.701 3.100 0.189 5.990 0.533 1.429
Age 14.139 15.084 7.811 3.103 2.515 0.225 1.216 1.989 1.960
Age^2 14.792 14.665 8.495 2.077 2.204 0.235 0.700 2.101 1.059
Schooling 7.677 2.534 0.938 8.552 5.884 5.574 5.064 1.028 1.455
Schooling^2 6.299 5.304 0.353 7.455 5.545 6.360 4.212 1.640 1.124
Schooling X Age 5.736 2.158 3.522 7.477 6.326 5.058 3.589 0.002 4.734
Head of Household 8.938 11.082 10.095 6.470 6.655 1.179 1.676 1.379 0.451
Household Size 7.250 13.823 6.795 1.231 6.042 3.250 5.488 4.066 1.712
# Adults 18‐65 3.829 7.686 0.102 0.354 10.811 2.642 4.798 4.338 2.595
# Seniors 65+ 11.655 14.116 4.246 8.055 12.230 3.279 2.217 2.259 1.621
Married 6.901 4.363 3.520 6.064 6.799 1.202 0.617 2.733 1.768
# Children 0‐5 2.104 3.004 5.082 0.164 0.522 2.491 3.582 3.675 2.969
# Children 6‐15 16.447 18.518 8.392 0.433 2.109 0.831 5.381 3.265 0.230
Female x # Child 0‐5 2.502 5.271 5.487 1.455 5.049 1.124 4.522 4.832 2.391




















Female 6.122 7.696 1.903 4.572 5.902 0.266 3.230 5.911 0.286 3.561 3.202 4.578
Literate 0.139 3.052 4.256 9.446 7.308 4.221 6.002 4.169 3.211 5.503 2.667 4.350
Age 2.586 3.203 1.309 2.352 3.510 0.992 1.412 2.975 0.662 0.116 0.183 1.648
Age^2 1.694 2.965 1.201 1.275 3.099 0.712 0.939 3.038 0.684 0.032 0.498 1.422
Schooling 5.903 6.402 5.497 1.841 1.008 1.734 1.577 0.867 1.527 1.281 0.392 2.770
Schooling^2 5.047 5.022 3.950 0.251 0.357 0.565 1.051 0.457 0.953 1.183 0.347 2.342
Schooling X Age 4.663 5.562 5.903 3.221 1.848 1.497 1.715 0.780 1.202 1.871 0.197 2.654
Head of Household 1.800 1.126 3.301 3.121 4.070 0.815 2.426 1.883 2.621 10.470 3.328 1.078
Household Size 8.773 7.914 4.381 7.660 7.085 3.552 1.655 5.605 2.826 4.543 1.925 1.330
# Adults 18‐65 7.778 7.399 4.609 7.203 6.625 4.893 1.658 4.417 4.074 6.410 1.473 4.351
# Seniors 65+ 4.860 4.756 6.416 3.248 2.890 3.922 2.992 1.771 0.845 5.352 2.233 0.025
Married 1.321 1.057 0.893 1.035 0.949 0.567 1.321 0.627 0.351 0.403 2.878 1.467
# Children 0‐5 1.163 0.491 1.199 1.892 0.199 0.844 2.965 1.476 2.488 9.767 3.074 6.856
# Children 6‐15 3.375 2.777 1.108 3.661 3.758 1.690 2.811 4.369 0.213 6.543 6.835 5.047
Female x # Child 0‐5 3.829 1.006 0.626 3.634 1.521 0.329 4.593 0.592 1.505 8.700 1.447 1.997













Female 4.071 3.545 0.302 4.914 5.174 2.530 1.688 1.874 0.829 7.340 3.844 0.914
Literate 1.175 2.767 1.964 1.647 0.208 0.539 5.471 2.080 1.950 0.016 0.792 2.651
Age 2.779 2.115 0.614 3.997 1.065 1.065 6.521 3.338 0.610 2.837 3.514 6.380
Age^2 2.122 1.660 0.959 3.294 0.762 1.035 6.183 3.272 0.534 2.962 3.377 6.766
Schooling 6.435 4.842 4.267 0.909 2.123 0.548 2.462 3.538 1.096 0.898 2.356 1.961
Schooling^2 5.962 3.679 3.701 0.981 2.921 1.180 1.745 3.778 1.353 0.870 2.251 0.985
Schooling X Age 5.686 3.869 4.276 1.134 1.949 0.092 3.193 4.433 0.792 0.667 1.726 3.696
Head of Household 3.543 3.153 0.820 6.370 4.061 1.679 8.826 6.089 1.723 0.672 3.564 4.775
Household Size 0.084 2.386 3.568 6.978 3.226 2.079 5.862 3.368 2.539 0.662 0.765 0.754
# Adults 18‐65 1.092 0.699 1.724 1.452 0.621 0.090 0.477 1.294 2.229 0.833 5.634 0.719
# Seniors 65+ 4.031 0.696 3.504 5.685 0.870 2.519 6.519 0.668 0.259 2.347 5.672 3.460
Married 4.815 5.124 3.375 0.713 0.259 2.064 2.533 0.230 1.928 5.779 6.502 7.135
# Children 0‐5 2.422 3.808 2.175 6.232 3.085 1.578 1.291 0.952 2.136 0.396 4.260 3.951
# Children 6‐15 3.696 4.844 6.569 3.563 3.967 2.656 4.406 5.483 2.190 0.920 5.051 2.433
Female x # Child 0‐5 7.713 10.446 1.618 8.392 10.890 1.077 5.965 4.359 2.201 7.366 8.932 2.637







Band=0.1 Band=0.01 Band=0.001 Band=0.0001








Female 0.867 1.263 1.162 0.167 2.399 0.367 0.055 0.358 0.872 3.996 2.277 3.120
Literate 0.154 2.484 3.612 2.326 0.058 2.007 6.399 4.430 2.122 1.871 2.404 0.118
Age 1.030 1.072 1.067 2.199 2.500 0.445 1.722 3.081 0.695 4.146 0.093 2.664
Age^2 0.521 0.847 1.149 2.773 2.696 0.388 2.279 3.718 0.667 3.660 0.672 2.773
Schooling 6.420 5.947 5.427 5.249 3.433 3.930 0.403 0.203 2.269 0.273 4.178 0.259
Schooling^2 5.876 4.464 4.691 5.945 2.715 3.539 0.585 0.336 2.570 0.047 4.351 0.229
Schooling X Age 5.786 5.483 5.303 6.302 4.075 4.730 0.299 0.344 2.244 2.852 4.410 0.014
Head of Household 2.440 1.907 1.214 3.901 4.715 1.749 5.114 5.786 3.400 7.239 8.706 3.825
Household Size 2.996 4.472 0.798 1.160 1.449 1.277 0.319 1.935 1.463 3.814 3.978 6.017
# Adults 18‐65 0.554 2.892 0.553 0.181 2.472 1.015 0.566 1.751 2.720 0.852 0.779 0.226
# Seniors 65+ 2.526 1.919 3.199 2.172 0.879 0.986 1.406 2.259 0.102 7.763 12.313 3.316
Married 0.558 0.580 0.459 2.886 1.247 1.645 4.112 0.958 1.673 9.153 11.515 3.976
# Children 0‐5 0.340 0.331 0.085 0.888 0.087 0.778 2.416 1.942 0.959 1.106 1.624 0.179
# Children 6‐15 3.912 4.170 0.611 2.328 1.075 1.667 3.436 3.968 1.037 10.671 11.217 9.744
Female x # Child 0‐5 1.255 1.296 1.230 1.818 0.673 1.466 3.183 0.096 0.447 0.539 1.010 2.142
Extreme Poverty 13.594 12.420 13.723 0.223 0.349 1.679 0.432 0.164 2.006 2.265 1.002 0.188








Female 0.867 1.263 1.162 0.167 2.399 0.367 0.055 0.358 0.872 3.996 2.277 3.120
Literate 0.154 2.484 3.612 2.326 0.058 2.007 6.399 4.430 2.122 1.871 2.404 0.118
Age 1.030 1.072 1.067 2.199 2.500 0.445 1.722 3.081 0.695 4.146 0.093 2.664
Age^2 0.521 0.847 1.149 2.773 2.696 0.388 2.279 3.718 0.667 3.660 0.672 2.773
Schooling 6.420 5.947 5.427 5.249 3.433 3.930 0.403 0.203 2.269 0.273 4.178 0.259
Schooling^2 5.876 4.464 4.691 5.945 2.715 3.539 0.585 0.336 2.570 0.047 4.351 0.229
Schooling X Age 5.786 5.483 5.303 6.302 4.075 4.730 0.299 0.344 2.244 2.852 4.410 0.014
Head of Household 2.440 1.907 1.214 3.901 4.715 1.749 5.114 5.786 3.400 7.239 8.706 3.825
Household Size 2.996 4.472 0.798 1.160 1.449 1.277 0.319 1.935 1.463 3.814 3.978 6.017
# Adults 18‐65 0.554 2.892 0.553 0.181 2.472 1.015 0.566 1.751 2.720 0.852 0.779 0.226
# Seniors 65+ 2.526 1.919 3.199 2.172 0.879 0.986 1.406 2.259 0.102 7.763 12.313 3.316
Married 0.558 0.580 0.459 2.886 1.247 1.645 4.112 0.958 1.673 9.153 11.515 3.976
# Children 0‐5 0.340 0.331 0.085 0.888 0.087 0.778 2.416 1.942 0.959 1.106 1.624 0.179
# Children 6‐15 3.912 4.170 0.611 2.328 1.075 1.667 3.436 3.968 1.037 10.671 11.217 9.744
Female x # Child 0‐5 1.255 1.296 1.230 1.818 0.673 1.466 3.183 0.096 0.447 0.539 1.010 2.142






Band=0.1 Band=0.01 Band=0.001 Band=0.0001
Band=0.1 Band=0.01






Female 4.053 4.992 0.839 11.333 6.925 1.968 2.910 4.896 0.428
Literate 5.978 2.893 0.892 14.011 10.570 8.521 1.062 0.728 1.470
Age 0.412 0.562 0.164 0.326 1.958 1.212 1.617 5.664 1.278
Age^2 0.189 0.996 0.219 1.113 1.016 1.665 1.640 5.667 1.314
Schooling 1.516 2.350 0.086 2.341 1.383 1.114 2.935 2.814 0.700
Schooling^2 2.092 2.548 0.212 0.586 0.117 0.033 4.017 4.608 1.174
Schooling X Age 0.481 1.817 0.103 3.885 3.828 1.433 2.822 0.161 0.639
Head of Household 6.230 6.211 0.175 6.193 4.386 1.001 1.147 4.651 0.219
Household Size 1.732 1.962 2.124 4.335 6.097 6.419 6.503 8.779 4.996
# Adults 18‐65 3.798 5.494 0.002 1.478 2.540 3.206 4.518 7.498 2.855
# Seniors 65+ 6.851 8.125 3.394 5.215 4.193 2.348 1.351 0.992 2.368
Married 4.934 3.976 2.444 0.235 0.698 1.671 2.811 0.155 0.110
# Children 0‐5 1.877 4.178 0.852 5.904 6.147 6.321 3.131 5.463 2.816
# Children 6‐15 1.369 0.184 1.435 2.470 0.012 0.146 4.211 3.317 2.712
Female x # Child 0‐5 4.940 2.542 2.805 2.875 0.236 3.478 2.892 5.061 2.434
Extreme Poverty 0.640 0.222 0.472 0.443 0.223 0.440 4.905 1.191 1.749






Female 1.009 2.654 2.451 6.313 6.239 0.137 7.153 8.448 1.396
Literate 3.555 4.491 3.376 4.312 6.624 2.915 1.382 0.546 1.350
Age 6.554 3.318 0.675 3.854 1.589 2.580 1.119 3.280 0.875
Age^2 6.583 3.512 0.905 4.353 1.534 2.562 1.627 3.166 0.914
Schooling 5.322 0.630 0.405 2.280 7.607 1.217 0.217 2.403 0.605
Schooling^2 2.455 2.462 0.464 0.575 5.699 0.763 0.441 3.302 0.413
Schooling X Age 3.693 0.079 0.214 2.045 8.948 1.028 0.501 1.019 0.990
Head of Household 1.158 0.747 2.469 5.510 10.506 2.003 1.194 0.636 0.335
Household Size 6.939 6.485 2.553 5.775 6.455 6.739 3.840 3.010 1.301
# Adults 18‐65 0.213 2.242 0.272 5.196 3.483 5.946 1.257 1.309 0.827
# Seniors 65+ 7.934 4.850 4.021 0.667 3.739 1.308 2.569 1.666 1.084
Married 0.268 1.069 0.125 6.053 2.369 4.901 2.289 1.029 0.116
# Children 0‐5 5.801 7.675 0.249 1.461 6.430 2.467 0.010 0.646 0.047
# Children 6‐15 3.270 2.668 1.394 1.733 1.761 1.947 3.410 2.252 1.493
Female x # Child 0‐5 5.293 5.701 4.140 7.919 12.206 0.189 2.298 2.901 0.098
















Female 0.200 0.297 0.016 2.336 2.382 2.197 8.216 6.864 2.966
Literate 2.064 5.340 5.144 3.088 1.220 0.361 2.051 2.812 0.470
Age 5.292 9.158 4.023 5.001 8.677 0.895 3.086 4.848 0.701
Age^2 5.530 9.147 3.847 4.236 8.134 0.953 3.209 4.812 0.785
Schooling 3.420 3.296 3.925 5.460 3.802 3.010 2.244 1.829 1.168
Schooling^2 2.917 0.375 3.406 5.942 4.058 3.291 4.256 5.447 2.466
Schooling X Age 4.530 6.799 5.635 3.720 0.941 4.008 0.588 1.811 1.209
Head of Household 0.511 0.388 0.348 8.075 9.397 0.870 0.959 2.728 0.434
Household Size 2.714 0.720 2.013 0.499 1.829 1.032 2.267 1.837 4.483
# Adults 18‐65 0.530 5.651 1.551 2.250 0.139 0.135 7.761 11.973 3.681
# Seniors 65+ 4.558 7.195 1.400 1.987 0.053 0.928 4.252 6.683 1.577
Married 3.253 0.894 0.622 0.703 1.049 1.547 4.625 1.450 1.412
# Children 0‐5 2.331 1.526 0.626 0.836 1.866 1.218 0.199 4.157 6.028
# Children 6‐15 1.141 0.510 0.308 2.725 3.792 0.525 3.214 9.264 0.695
Female x # Child 0‐5 5.879 1.818 0.761 0.094 0.662 2.508 1.474 5.138 7.320
Extreme Poverty 3.054 2.058 3.872 0.247 0.345 0.323 4.575 2.361 0.568






Female 0.200 0.297 0.016 2.336 2.382 2.197 8.216 6.864 2.966
Literate 2.064 5.340 5.144 3.088 1.220 0.361 2.051 2.812 0.470
Age 5.292 9.158 4.023 5.001 8.677 0.895 3.086 4.848 0.701
Age^2 5.530 9.147 3.847 4.236 8.134 0.953 3.209 4.812 0.785
Schooling 3.420 3.296 3.925 5.460 3.802 3.010 2.244 1.829 1.168
Schooling^2 2.917 0.375 3.406 5.942 4.058 3.291 4.256 5.447 2.466
Schooling X Age 4.530 6.799 5.635 3.720 0.941 4.008 0.588 1.811 1.209
Head of Household 0.511 0.388 0.348 8.075 9.397 0.870 0.959 2.728 0.434
Household Size 2.714 0.720 2.013 0.499 1.829 1.032 2.267 1.837 4.483
# Adults 18‐65 0.530 5.651 1.551 2.250 0.139 0.135 7.761 11.973 3.681
# Seniors 65+ 4.558 7.195 1.400 1.987 0.053 0.928 4.252 6.683 1.577
Married 3.253 0.894 0.622 0.703 1.049 1.547 4.625 1.450 1.412
# Children 0‐5 2.331 1.526 0.626 0.836 1.866 1.218 0.199 4.157 6.028
# Children 6‐15 1.141 0.510 0.308 2.725 3.792 0.525 3.214 9.264 0.695
Female x # Child 0‐5 5.879 1.818 0.761 0.094 0.662 2.508 1.474 5.138 7.320
















Female 7.453 1.105 1.253 0.561 4.907 1.500
Literate 5.018 7.456 5.793 5.599 11.581 1.693
Age 6.066 2.553 2.424 7.621 9.582 2.922
Age^2 4.073 1.730 1.961 6.919 9.065 2.380
Schooling 2.833 2.505 7.262 5.255 8.064 1.225
Schooling^2 4.355 4.181 8.891 7.833 7.700 0.422
Schooling X Age 8.577 6.620 8.633 2.965 5.875 2.342
Head of Household 6.563 4.236 6.569 0.851 2.279 4.993
Household Size 4.742 2.981 1.364 19.943 18.244 7.606
# Adults 18‐65 7.111 8.460 0.693 12.956 9.289 0.515
# Seniors 65+ 4.784 2.282 4.996 2.098 4.409 1.516
Married 6.355 7.749 1.159 9.883 3.781 4.547
# Children 0‐5 6.494 6.579 0.422 17.438 19.106 12.983
# Children 6‐15 10.596 1.324 3.090 13.969 16.413 5.894
Female x # Child 0‐5 0.104 2.491 2.401 10.048 12.817 9.049







Female 1.476 1.862 9.373 7.756 11.972 10.675
Literate 6.954 5.369 7.675 17.596 17.563 8.340
Age 10.666 14.681 16.131 22.943 19.949 0.817
Age^2 11.148 16.400 16.294 23.872 19.454 0.984
Schooling 21.563 7.692 3.458 15.541 18.124 5.917
Schooling^2 15.294 3.499 3.341 18.801 21.884 6.991
Schooling X Age 21.267 5.578 2.778 11.087 11.864 4.222
Head of Household 1.384 1.006 10.665 17.030 10.766 15.457
Household Size 8.155 8.290 10.378 6.794 0.761 3.279
# Adults 18‐65 27.449 1.626 19.012 1.291 13.921 4.156
# Seniors 65+ 15.402 14.207 14.009 12.763 10.116 15.832
Married 11.406 4.609 2.914 0.719 7.619 6.218
# Children 0‐5 4.225 1.801 12.183 22.688 24.751 1.001
# Children 6‐15 8.918 5.765 4.702 0.500 5.204 0.042
Female x # Child 0‐5 4.613 0.703 9.010 15.219 21.874 11.804















Female 9.123 6.382 2.087 3.203 1.519 0.176
Literate 5.139 3.506 1.476 3.438 0.802 3.811
Age 2.533 2.598 0.850 3.114 1.009 2.204
Age^2 2.946 3.246 1.167 4.125 3.105 2.468
Schooling 2.988 7.170 0.623 4.806 0.440 8.523
Schooling^2 2.780 6.450 0.368 6.998 0.439 7.750
Schooling X Age 2.239 8.515 2.533 2.953 0.529 7.257
Head of Household 1.370 4.370 0.384 1.002 10.130 7.086
Household Size 4.361 7.433 2.124 2.544 2.129 7.151
# Adults 18‐65 0.405 4.138 0.868 9.921 4.737 4.374
# Seniors 65+ 6.440 5.655 4.684 12.619 12.132 1.764
Married 3.659 0.781 2.868 4.096 5.151 8.235
# Children 0‐5 5.226 7.218 3.118 2.697 1.965 2.572
# Children 6‐15 4.043 2.784 0.849 1.655 0.316 4.030
Female x # Child 0‐5 2.071 1.630 1.517 5.588 6.167 0.842







Female 9.123 6.382 2.087 3.203 1.519 0.176
Literate 5.139 3.506 1.476 3.438 0.802 3.811
Age 2.533 2.598 0.850 3.114 1.009 2.204
Age^2 2.946 3.246 1.167 4.125 3.105 2.468
Schooling 2.988 7.170 0.623 4.806 0.440 8.523
Schooling^2 2.780 6.450 0.368 6.998 0.439 7.750
Schooling X Age 2.239 8.515 2.533 2.953 0.529 7.257
Head of Household 1.370 4.370 0.384 1.002 10.130 7.086
Household Size 4.361 7.433 2.124 2.544 2.129 7.151
# Adults 18‐65 0.405 4.138 0.868 9.921 4.737 4.374
# Seniors 65+ 6.440 5.655 4.684 12.619 12.132 1.764
Married 3.659 0.781 2.868 4.096 5.151 8.235
# Children 0‐5 5.226 7.218 3.118 2.697 1.965 2.572
# Children 6‐15 4.043 2.784 0.849 1.655 0.316 4.030
Female x # Child 0‐5 2.071 1.630 1.517 5.588 6.167 0.842
Extreme Poverty 3.734 1.166 1.801 1.929 2.968 1.773
Note: To test the sensitivity, a Placebo test was conducted as follows: the sample is divided randomly 
into two control groups. An estimation is then performed as indicated in the table header.
Urban Area Rural Area
Rural Area
Table C‐23: Comparative Results by Location ‐ Bono Gas Program
Table C‐24: Comparative Results by Location ‐ All Programs
Note: To test the sensitivity, a Placebo test was conducted as follows: the sample is divided randomly 
into two control groups. An estimation is then performed as indicated in the table header.
Urban Area
